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Abstract
Market based instruments are proving e⁄ective in biodiversity procure-
ment and in the management of regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity.
The design of these schemes brings together issues in auction design, con-
tract theory, ecology, and monitoring. Using a mixed adverse selection,
moral hazard procurement model, we show that optimal contract design
may di⁄er signi￿cantly between procurement and regulatory policy environ-
ments.
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1The preservation of biodiversity, through the protection and enhancement of
environmental assets, is an objective shared by governments around the world.
Often these assets are on private land, but provide environmental services with
a strong public good element. The management of these assets presents di¢ cult
public policy problems, since private landholders may not have the incentive to
make socially optimal decisions. In response to this problem governments use a
range of policies to in￿ uence landholders￿behaviour, including regulation to pro-
hibit actions that endanger, damage or deplete environmental assets, and incentive
programs to increase investment in nature conservation; these programs include,
for example, broad-based conservation subsidies, input subsidies and support for
volunteer programs.
Regulation and simple incentive programs have in many cases proven to be rel-
atively ine¢ cient and ine⁄ective, especially for non-point-source problems (see for
example ANA (2001)), and a range of market oriented schemes have been intro-
duced with the aim of improving economic e¢ ciency. Examples include tradeable
emission permit schemes for Sulphur, Nitrogen and Carbon (Tietenberg 2002), bio-
diversity procurement auctions (Stoneham, Chaudhri, Ha & Strappazzon 2007),
and environmental o⁄set markets such as the US EPA￿ s wetlands o⁄set program
(BEST 2001) or the Victorian Bush Broker Scheme1. For a recent review of pro-
curement in the context of biodiversity economics see Kontoleon, Pascual & Swan-
son (2007).
Market oriented schemes can be broadly classi￿ed into three types: public
procurement of environmental services (where the government is the purchaser),
private procurement of environmental services (where a private developer is pur-
chasing an o⁄set required in order to get regulatory approval for some development
project), and markets designed to match private buyers and sellers of o⁄sets. We
will give examples of each of these types later in this paper. There are important
design and architecture problems to be addressed for all of these environmental
policy institutions.
One of the salient features of both private and public procurement programs for
non-point-source outcomes is the delegation of conservation activities to private
landholders. In these policy institutions the principal (whether the government
or a developer) faces asymmetric information problems. Adverse selection is a
problem because the principal cannot gauge the key characteristics of suppliers ￿
for example, the principal cannot gather detailed information on the environmental
characteristics of a site, or a supplier￿ s opportunity cost of providing environmental
services. Moral hazard is a problem because procurement of environmental services
requires the supplier to undertake actions and to protect a site through time, and
it is di¢ cult for the principal to observe and monitor compliance with a contract.
1This is documented at http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/dse/
2Because environmental procurement is subject to exogenous risks (for example,
drought, disease and predators), it is critical that contract design accounts for
risk as well as for these asymmetrical information problems. Contract design
(and therefore the incentive to comply with a contract) is fundamental to the
environmental integrity of all these policy institutions.
Contract design for environmental services has been considered by a number of
authors. For example, Antle, Capalbo, Mooney, Elliott & Paustian (2003) discuss
contracts to procure carbon sequestration services, and Feng, Kurkalova, Kling &
Gassman (2006) consider the design of conservation incentive schemes, but nei-
ther of these authors consider issues of asymmetric information or incentive com-
patibility. Following the foundational contribution of Baron & Myerson (1982)
on regulation under asymmetric information, there has been a steadily growing
literature on optimal environmental policy under asymmetric information. This
literature re￿ ects the importance of heterogeneity and highly disaggregated pri-
vate information in the environmental sector, and the fundamental constraints
that these impose on policy. Spulber (1988) consideres optimal quotas and taxes
for a polluting industry under asymmetric information. Smith (1995) applies a
model of this type to design a least cost mechanism to retire agricultural land for
environmental purposes. Wu & Babcock (1996) study the optimal design of an
input tax or subsidy in a model of joint production of agricultural production and
a pollutant. Crepin (2005) models wetland procurement. Sheri⁄ (2008) studies
optimal regulation in the presence of political constraints.
There are common features in all of these models that make them inappro-
priate to model biodiversity procurement. While adverse selection is taken into
account, these are all essentially single agent models in that universal participation
is assumed. A multi-agent assumption, which would lead naturally to an optimal
auction framework, would be more appropriate. More signi￿cant is the fact that
these models do not address moral hazard. The actions that are procurred (for
example, not collecting fallen ￿rewood from a forest) are intrinsically di¢ cult to
observe, and are related by complicated and indirect means to desired outcomes
(for example the presence and prevalence of certain species). Risk and uncertainty,
both in the environmental production function and in the monitoring and mea-
surement technology, are clearly important as well. We thus need a mixed model,
incorporating multiple agents, risky production, adverse selection and moral haz-
ard in order to to address these issues.
In this paper we apply a version of the La⁄ont & Tirole (1986) procurement
model, modi￿ed to allow for a risk aversion. This model is very tractable, and suf-
￿ciently ￿ exible to address the issues that we are interested in. We examine issues
that arise in the design of contracts under di⁄erent assumptions about the policy
institution. The main question that we ask is whether one can design a common
3type of contract that can be used across a range of institutions (public procure-
ment, private procurement, procurement by a market maker in an o⁄set market),
or whether contract design must be sensitive to the institutional framework.
In order to establish a concrete context, and to clarify the nature of the eco-
nomic problems that we are endeavouring to solve through contract design, we
￿rst summarise what a typical biodiversity procurement and preservation scheme
looks like in practice. We then formally address the contract design issue, and
￿nally we discuss some practical implications of the model in a real world design
context.
1 Biodiversity procurement
In order to establish a concrete context we will outline the background to, and the
development of, a typical biodiversity procurement program in Victoria, Australia.
In doing so we will focus on the various informational constraints, which are so
pervasive in this area, and the variety of strategies that can be applied to address
them. We will be particularly interested in clarifying which issues must be resolved
through contract design, and which can be addressed elsewhere in the institutional
design problem.
Since European settlement in the late eighteenth century there has been sub-
stantial biodiversity loss though settlement and the agricultural development of
the Australian continent. By the end of the nineteenth century, increasing public
awareness of the need to protect environmental assets led to the creation of national
parks. However, many ecosystems ￿for example, extensive and diverse grasslands
￿lay outside such protection and were largely destroyed2. As a result some of
Australia￿ s rarest and most important ecosystems have been reduced to remnant
habitat fragments on private land. As public awareness of this loss of biodiversity
has increased, government has responded by taking increased responsibility for
biodiversity management. Over the past decade State and Federal Governments
have allocated well over $300 million to biodiversity and habitat-related initiatives,
mostly relating to the management of assets on private land.
Traditionally the Victorian Government sought to preserve and rehabilitate
biodiversity through broad-based, un-targeted conservation subsidies for volunteer
programs and through regulatory prohibitions on any further damage to biodiver-
sity assets. Both of these policies face incentive problems: regulation creates an
incentive for landholders to conceal environmentally valuable biodiversity located
on their land, and although voluntary conservation is extremely valuable, incen-
tives for participants to create value over the longer term are weak or absent. In
2Since European settlement, 90 per cent of the native vegetation in the eastern temperate
zone has been removed (ANZECC 2000).
4addition, while voluntary measures are well meaning, these interventions may not
always be supported by good science or directed to the highest value activities. In
the last decade government has moved toward a market based approach to bio-
diversity rehabilitation based on scienti￿c modelling and a formal application of
economic design principles.
Biodiversity management presents di¢ cult public policy problems; asymmet-
ric information is the source of many of these di¢ culties. Information about the
existence and status of biodiversity assets, about the potential actions that might
be taken to preserve and protect these assets, and about the opportunity cost
of actions, is highly disaggregated and subject to adverse selection. The adverse
selection problem is compounded by the complexity of biodiversity resources; bio-
diversity is a highly heterogeneous environmental asset. The Victorian Environ-
mental Vegetation framework classi￿es native vegetation communities into more
than 300 major and minor vegetation types, which di⁄er in abundance, distribu-
tion and conservation status (DSE 2004). Moral hazard is also a problem because
it is di¢ cult and costly to observe and monitor private landholders￿compliance
with procurement contracts. The moral hazard problem is exacerbated by the
highly stochastic nature of environmental production.
Three strategies have been useful in addressing these problems. First, since
informational obstacles lie at the root of so many of the di¢ culties in this area,
a systematic attempt has been made to reduce the informational disadvantage as
much as possible through the use of appropriate technology and science. The devel-
opment of new science and technology to address these issues has been fundamental
in the development of these schemes. Field ecologists have developed e¢ cient en-
vironmental classi￿cation and scoring methods (Parkes, Newell & Cheal 2003),
and protocols using remote sensing, biophysical models and landscape databases,
that allow the classi￿cation and valuation of environmental assets with relatively
high accuracy and low transaction costs in a single site visit. This ensures that,
when procuring biodiversity, the government knows, and can value, what it is
purchasing3. It also provides a basis for providing information to landholders on
potentially valuable actions that government may be willing to purchase4, and for
3It is important to be clear about what is meant by valuation in this context. We assume
that the government has a policy with respect to the inventory of environmental assets that
it manages, and that government scientists maximise the value of this inventory, according to
this policy objective and subject to their budget constraint. We are not concerned with the
policy objective or with the optimal size of the agency￿ s budget constraint, but merely with the
government￿ s ability to understand and assess what it is buying, and to do so at minimum cost.
To be quite clear, we are not concerned with the demand for environmental public goods
but with the e¢ cient supply of such goods. The demand for such public goods is already
comprehensively addressed in the literature.
4Some information is typically provided on what actions might potentially be purchased, but
not on how valuable they might be or on whether there are substitutes.
5evaluating the outcome of interventions. Second, adverse selection is addressed by
purchasing environmental service contracts through procurement auctions. Bids
are ranked according to the environmental bene￿ts they generate and the price
of the contract and then accepted or rejected competitively. This process allows
government to identify and contract with low-cost suppliers of biodiversity im-
provements. Finally, moral hazard is addressed by writing incentive contracts
contingent on observable actions and outcomes.
This approach has been found to substantially improve the e¢ ciency of gov-
ernment spending (Stoneham et al. 2007). Much better environmental outcomes
have been achieved per dollar expended. Because of the emphasis on incentive-
compatibility, the interests of landholders and Government are brought much more
closely into alignment; in particular, the incentives to reveal private information are
much improved, and a number of previously unknown valuable biodiversity assets
have been revealed and rehabilitated. Consistent with the incentive-compatible
design of the program, there has been wide-spread acceptance of this approach
across a range of di⁄erent interest and stakeholder groups5.
Building on this successful experience with competitive procurement of envi-
ronmental services, it is natural to extend it to the procurement of environmental
o⁄sets for development. Under the existing ￿no net loss￿regulatory framework, de-
velopers are able to destroy existing habitat assets provided that they are granted
a permit to do so and that the loss of habitat is o⁄set by the rehabilitation and per-
manent protection of a commensurate habitat asset. O⁄sets may be contracted to
a third-party supplier of environmental services. Because o⁄sets are underpinned
by a stringent regulatory framework, third-party o⁄sets are associated with high
transaction costs. Developers must identify an environmentally acceptable o⁄set
site, negotiate with potential suppliers on a bilateral basis, design and enter into a
contract with suppliers and meet the Government￿ s compliance and administrative
requirements. There is also a signi￿cant combinatorial allocation problem. Given
the heterogeneous nature of habitat assets, one development project may require
a package of o⁄sets, and one o⁄set project may contribute to more than one de-
velopment project. Given the Government￿ s investment in the infrastructure to
support e¢ cient environmental procurement, there is an obvious role for govern-
ment as a facilitator of the market for third-party o⁄sets. A government-facilitated
matching market not only reduces transaction costs but improves the environmen-
tal integrity of the o⁄set policy. Such a market has recently been announced in
Victoria.
There are thus three distinct frameworks for the purchase of environmental
assets. The ￿rst is the procurement by auction of biodiversity as a public good
5Project documentation, reports and evaluations of a number of recent biodiversity procure-
ment auctions are available at http://dse.vic.gov.
6by government. The second is the private purchase of environmental o⁄-sets by
developers. The third is the facilitation of trade in the o⁄-set market by the gov-
ernment6 through the procurement of environmental assets on behalf of developers.
In each case, the question arises of how to write the contract with the seller of the
environmental service. Contract design is important in ensuring that sellers have
the incentive to deliver what was agreed, and to do so in the most e¢ cient way. It
is also important in convincing government that what is being purchased will be
delivered.
2 The model
In considering the issues that arise in biodiversity procurement we will use a ver-
sion7 of La⁄ont and Tirole￿ s basic procurement model (La⁄ont & Tirole 1986),
which we modify to allow for risk aversion8. This is a tractable model that is
well suited to exploring the issues that arise in biodiversity procurement. It is
a useful and ￿ exible procurement model, allowing for both adverse selection and
moral hazard, with the advantage that the interaction between contract design
and auction design is particularly transparent (La⁄ont & Tirole 1987). We will
follow the notation of their monograph (La⁄ont & Tirole 1993), which di⁄ers in
some respects from the original paper.
By varying the principal￿ s objective function, we can examine, in a uni￿ed
manner, the three di⁄erent policy environments mentioned above. The key para-
meters will be ￿; the weight placed by the principal on the welfare of the agent,
and ￿; the deadweight cost of raising taxation revenue. For public procurement
￿ = 1 (since the utilitarian government maximises e¢ ciency) and ￿ > 0; for pri-
vate procurement ￿ = ￿ = 0; since the principal maximises his own pro￿t; in a
government intermediated o⁄-set market ￿ = 1 but ￿ = 0 since the government
is concerned with e¢ ciency, and revenue is not raised through coercive taxation.
Since we are concerned with optimal contract design we will ￿rst consider an en-
vironment where a single principal contracts with a single agent. We will discuss
below how this case can be modi￿ed if there are many agents, and the right to
participate is auctioned.
A participating agent can produce environmental output x + " = ￿ + e + ";
where ￿ is the agent￿ s type, e ￿ 0 is e⁄ort exerted by the agent, and " is a random
6In principle one could imagine a private intermediary playing this role; this seems unlikely
due to economies of scale and government￿ s existing role in guaranteeing the integrity of traded
o⁄-sets.
7We reinterpret e⁄ort as output enhancing rather than cost reducing.
8See La⁄ont & Tirole (1986, p. 663) for some general remarks about risk aversion in their
model.
7shock with mean zero and variance ￿2 re￿ ecting the fact that production is risky
(it may also incorporate risk introduced by errors in measuring output). We regard
the type ￿ as an endowment of the environmental good, for example a quantity of
habitat (measured in quality adjusted units), which can be augmented through the
exertion of e⁄ort e (for example by improving its quality through the eradication
of weeds or feral animals, or protection from ￿re hazards, or revegetation). Both e
and ￿ are private information, known only to the agent, but total output x can be
measured (possibly with some error incorporated in ") by the principal. We assume




with distribution function F (￿) and density function f (￿) and that the inverse
hazard rate h(￿) =
1￿F(￿)
f(￿) is non-increasing. We assume that the principal is risk
neutral.
The agent￿ s utility v (t;e) = g (t) ￿   (e) is separable in the income transfer t
that will be made by the principal, and in e⁄ort e; and is strictly concave (risk
averse) in t: For any random transfer z; let c(z) be the cost of risk bearing (the in-
surance premium that would make the agent indi⁄erent between z and its expected
value ￿ z; net of the insurance premium) de￿ned by Eg (z) = g (￿ z ￿ c(z)): By the
separability assumption, we can re-label indi⁄erence curves to linearise g (z) (see,
for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green (1995, p 45)). We can thus assume
that the agent￿ s utility9, given a random transfer z and an e⁄ort level e; is of the
form
~ v (z;e) = ￿ z ￿ c(z) ￿   (e):
Thus, given this normalisation, the agent￿ s utility depends on the expected trans-
fer, subject to adjustments for a risk premium and for the disutility of e⁄ort.
Following La⁄ont and Tirole, we will assume10 that disutility of e⁄ort is increasing
and concave in e⁄ort:   (0) = 0;  (e) ￿ 0;  
0(e) ￿ 0; and  00(e) > 0: We will also
assume, as do they, that  
000 (e) ￿ 0:





where ￿ is an appropriate coe¢ cient of risk aversion (Newbery & Stiglitz 1981,
pp. 69-80). This relationship holds exactly if z is normally distributed and the
underlying utility function v (t;e) displays constant absolute risk aversion with
coe¢ cient of risk aversion ￿; the reader may wish to keep this case in mind11.
9This may no longer be an expected utility functional of z:We note that this type of normali-
sation is conventional in ￿nance, where a mean-variance speci￿cation of preferences is standard.
Such preferences are of course not of expected utility form, except in exceptional cases.
10The plausibility of these assumptions, which of course depend upon our normalisation lin-
earising f (t); is ultimately an empirical matter.
11It also holds exactly if the underlying utility function is quadratic.
8In general, it will hold approximately if the variance is small; the appropriate
coe¢ cient of risk aversion will then depend upon wealth and background risk (for
a recent discussion in the context of a mean variance speci￿cation see Franke,
Stapleton & Subrahmanyam (2004)). In the interest of tractability we will assume
that risk preferences are of this form, and we will ignore wealth e⁄ects, due to the
contract, on risk preferences. That is, we assume that the impact of the contract
on the agent￿ s risk and wealth position is not su¢ cient to signi￿cantly a⁄ect their
risk preferences, and we will treat ￿ as a constant. This seems reasonable provided
that the agent￿ s risk and return exposure through the contract is not dominant
in the agent￿ s portfolio of investments and activities. This seems a reasonable
assumption in the policy context with which we are concerned.
The principal o⁄ers a menu of linear contracts12
T
￿











contingent on announced type ^ ￿ and linear in observed output x + ": If the agent
announces type ^ ￿ and chooses e⁄ort e consistent with expected output x = e+￿,







































































































is linear in expected outcome (or equivalently e⁄ort e). We note that the slopes
of the contracts T
￿




















12In contradistinction to (La⁄ont & Tirole 1986), we restrict ourselves to linear contracts in
order to accommodate risk aversion.
9accommodate the cost of risk bearing. We notice13 that, irrespective of ^ ￿; the








for the information rent earned by an agent of type ￿: We write e(￿) for the
optimal e⁄ort function implied by the contract and x(￿) = e(￿) + ￿ for the
implied expected output. We will write
t(￿) = ET (x(￿) + ";￿)
= T (x(￿);￿)
= a(￿) + b(￿)x(￿)
~ t(￿) = ~ T (x(￿);￿)












for the expected transfer and the risk adjusted expected transfer respectively. To
reduce notation we will when convenient drop the argument ￿ and write x; t; ~ t;
e; u; a; b; f; F; h; instead of x(￿); t(￿); ~ t(￿);e(￿); u(￿); a(￿); b(￿); f (￿);
F (￿); h(￿); and we will denote di⁄erentiation with respect to ￿ by a dot. If
the principal o⁄ers an incentive compatible individually rational contract, then by
standard arguments we have
u = ~ t ￿   (e)
x = e + ￿







_ u =  
0 (e)
b =  
0 (e)
:
~ t =  
0 (e) _ x






These are, respectively, the de￿nitions of u; x and ~ t; the envelope condition, the ￿rst
and second order conditions, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality. As
13This is because of the additive speci￿cation of the error " and our assumption that, for wealth
variations implied by the contract, ￿ is constant.












_ x =  
0 (e): This contract





The principal chooses the contract (x;t) (and hence implicitly e and u), subject






fx ￿ (1 + ￿)t + ￿ugdF
where ￿ is the cost of raising the revenue t; and ￿ 2 [0;1] is the weight placed by
the principal on the agent￿ s utility. We shall interpret the value of these parame-
ters in the policy environments of interest below. After an integration by parts,
making use of the envelope condition and the individual rationality constraint, the






e + ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)
￿











We note the term containing ￿ in the expression for the virtual surplus; it is through
this term that risk aversion enters into the contracting problem.
By a standard argument the integrand is concave in e; and the optimal e⁄ort
is determined at interior points by the principal￿ s ￿rst order condition








+ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)h 
00 (e):





that the contract may be implemented by a menu of linear contracts, tangent to
the contract curve.
We now consider the case of multiple agents. Under risk neutrality contract
design is particularly simple La⁄ont & Tirole (1987). If there are multiple agents
the interaction between contract design and a preliminary auction is particularly
simple. The optimal mechanism can be implemented by conducting a preliminary
auction14 of the right to participate, and then o⁄ering exactly the menu of contracts
derived above for the single agent case. The e⁄ect of the entry fee, as determined





14If one object is to be purchased than a second price auction is appropriate. If multiple objects
are to be purchased, as in our context, then a uniform price second price auction is appropriate.
11where ￿0 is the type of the highest non-participating agent. Thus competition
between agents reduces, but does not entirely eliminate, uncertainty about the
agents￿types. This residual uncertainty is managed through the contract design.
An important implication is that contract design is invariant to the number of
participants in the auction.
Under risk aversion the analysis is not straight forward, except in one case that
we will focus on. If the cost of e⁄ort function   (e) is quadratic15 (this includes
the case of constant marginal e⁄ort) and we write






for the total cost including risk bearing, then the Hamiltonian (1) can be written
e + ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)￿(e) ￿




where ￿ =  
00 (e); which is a constant. The problem is then isomorphic to the risk
neutral case, but with the hazard rate adjusted by a constant factor, becoming
h
(1+￿￿￿2): La⁄ont and Tirole￿ s proofs then go through exactly as before, so we get the
basic separability result. Thus in this quadratic cost case the optimal mechanism
can be implemented by a preliminary auction of the right to participate, and then
by allowing participants to choose a contract from the menu derived above exactly
as in the single agent case. In particular, the design of the menu of contracts does
not depend on the number of potential participants in the mechanism.
3 An example
We illustrate with a numerical example. Let us assume that ￿ is distributed












; and that   (e) = e2
2 :




= [0;1]: In this case the principal￿ s ￿rst
order condition is





so the contractual level of e⁄ort is
e =
1 + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿￿2)
:
The principal￿ s virtual surplus (the expression in the integrand (1)) is
k (￿) =




1 + ￿ + (1 + ￿)￿￿2 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2￿
￿ + 1
2 (￿ ￿ ￿)
2
(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿￿2)
15This is clearly a restrictive assumption, but not unreasonable as a ￿rst approximation.
12which is convex, and non-negative at ￿ = 0: A simple calculation shows that k (￿)
is minimised at ￿0 = ￿(1￿￿2)+(￿￿￿2)+2￿￿+￿￿2(1+￿)
(1+￿￿￿)2 which is negative provided that
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: Thus k (￿) is non negative over the whole interval [0;1],
and u can be calculated by integrating _ u =  
0 (e) from zero, yielding
u =
(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)￿
2 + 2(￿ ￿ ￿)￿
2(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿￿2)
:
In general, the virtual surplus will not be non-negative over the whole interval.
There will be some cut-o⁄ type ￿0 such that k (￿0) = 0: The principal will wish
to exclude all types below this, and u will be determined by integrating from ￿0:
The transfers t and ~ t are readily calculated from e and u:
3.1 Policy settings
We show in Figures 1 and 2 the behaviour of variables of interest for typical
parameters, using the example calculated above. In these Figures we have allowed





= [￿1;0:5]; to illustrate the scenario where many landholders
will own a signi￿cantly degraded asset which would, without any remedial e⁄ort,
have a negative value as an environmental o⁄-set, while some may hold assets of
considerable value. These Figures also illustrate that there is a critical cut-o⁄
type, and types below this would not participate.
We consider, as above, three policy settings. The ￿rst is government procure-
ment. The government is e¢ ciency maximising, putting equal weight on the utility
of the principal (the tax payer) and the agent, so ￿ = 1; but raises revenue through
distortionary taxation, so ￿ > 0: In this example, we have put ￿ = :2: This policy
setting is shown with a dashed line. The second setting is private procurement of
environmental o⁄sets. In this case, we have assumed that the principal (the devel-
oper) is a monopsonistic16 purchaser, facing no funding distortion, and placing no
weight on the utility of the agent, so we set ￿ = ￿ = 0: This case is shown with a
solid line. In the third case the government, acting as an intermediary in the o⁄-
set market, procures o⁄-sets and sells them on to developers. We assume that the
government is benevolent, placing equal weight on both parties (so we implicitly
assume that the government acts to correct the monopsony distortion, maximising
total social surplus rather than just the monopsonist￿ s share). Since the o⁄-set is
paid for by the developer, there is no funding distortion, and we set ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:
This case is shown with a dotted line. Figure 1 shows e⁄ort, output, transfer
16This means that they can unilaterally design the contract, as is usually assumed in principal-
agent problems.
13and the agent￿ s information rent by type. Figure 2 shows the optimal contract.
This may be represented as a nonlinear contract in either observable (x + ";t)
output-transfer space, or in the agent￿ s (e;u) e⁄ort-utility decision space.
We also show, in the ￿nal panel of Figure 2, the menu of linear contracts
that implements the optimal contract. A linear contract is a contract of the form
t = a + bx; promising a ￿xed up-front payment a; and a conditional payment bx
that depends upon the output achieved. Since typically 0 ￿ b ￿ 1; this takes
the form of a surplus sharing rule. For example, if a = 3 and b = :5; then the
contract would specify an up front payment of 3 plus 50% of the value of the
output generated. By o⁄ering a menu of such contracts t = a(￿)+b(￿)x; one for
each type ￿; the agent can choose either a soft contract (with a low b and a weak
incentive to maximise output) or a tough contract (with a high b and a strong
incentive to maximise output). The agent who chooses the tough contract will
be rewarded with a higher up front payment a. By the revelation principal, each
agent will choose the contract appropriate to their type. By choosing this contract,
they are in e⁄ect induced to reveal their private information, and optimal e⁄ort is
induced.
It may happen that the up front payment is negative. In this case, it is conve-
nient to specify the linear contract as an output target and a marginal payment,
rather than an up front payment and a marginal payment. For example if a = ￿1
and b = :5; then the contract t = ￿1+:5x can be written equivalently t = :5(x ￿ 1)
which can be interpreted to say that the agent gets nothing until they reach an
output target (of 1 in this case), and then they get 50% of the value of the output
beyond this target that they produce. In the third panel of Figure 2 we have cho-
sen to present the menu of contracts in this form, as a locus of pairs (x0;b) where
x0 is an output target and b is an output value share. Clearly a negative output
share can be reinterpreted as a positive up front payment, just as a negative up
front payment can be interpreted as an output target.
It is clear from these Figures that the optimal contract is quite di⁄erent in each
policy setting. The o⁄set market contract is particularly simple and it is easy to
see why this should be so, especially if agents are risk neutral. In this case, the
government wants to maximise total surplus and does not care how it is allocated.
In particular, it is happy for the agent to retain all the surplus (this surplus may
be extracted separately, through a preliminary auction, as discussed above). The
natural solution is to "sell the project to the agent", allowing the agent to retain all
the surplus at the margin, and hence to internalise all externalities. The principal
thus o⁄ers a simple pooling contract inducing the ￿rst best e⁄ort level. If the
agents are risk averse then it is no longer optimal for them to bear all the risk, but
since risk aversion is unrelated to type under our assumptions it is not useful to
screen agents by exposure to risk, and a simple pooling contract is still optimal.
14In this policy setting the same contact is o⁄ered to everyone.
In contrast, the private purchaser has a strong incentive to minimise transfers
to the agent (￿ = 0), and implements a diverse menu that separates types strongly,
inducing a wide variation in e⁄ort levels. The government procurement contract
is in some ways intermediate between the two. The government has an incentive
to minimise transfers to the agent because of the distortionary cost of raising
revenue (￿ = :2). It also implements a screening contract, but one that screens
less aggressively than that the private developer.
The contracts, as actually implemented, have a rather di⁄erent style to them
(the details here are sensitive to the parameters chosen). When procuring for the
o⁄-set market, the government o⁄ers a simple take it or leave it contract (not a
menu), characterised by an up front payment and a relatively high performance
incentive. The developer o⁄ers a wide range of linear contracts, characterised by
an output target and a range of performance incentives, some of them quite weak.
When procuring to augment the stock of public goods, government o⁄ers a menu
of contracts that is intermediate between the two. With the parameters chosen
here, the high power contracts are characterised by an output target, while the
low power contracts are characterised by an up front payment.
4 Discussion
Market based instruments for biodiversity procurement, either to enhance the
stock of assets or to facilitate trade in o⁄-set markets are increasingly important.
Standard procurement models can be adapted to provide a workable framework for
contract design in such markets. What do we learn from this modelling exercise?
First of all, it is not the case that contract design can be treated as a discrete
problem without considering the policy environment. Contracting frameworks that
make sense in one environment cannot necessarily be applied without thought to
another, despite the apparent similarity of the problems.
In the case of biodiversity regulation and procurement, we ￿nd that contract
design is simplest for the case of o⁄-set markets. In this case there is no need to
screen agents through the contracting framework, and a simple o⁄-the-shelf linear
contract will do to job. This simple contract will have two components: a ￿xed
component a (which may be either positive or negative) and a variable component
b. Participation is then determined by an auction, in which landholders compete
to bid down the size of the payment t that they would be paid in order to sign a
contract. The net immediate payment, on signing of the contract, is a + t: The
variable payment, received at the end of the contract, depends on the outcome. b
is the proportion of the value created that goes to the landholder.
In practice, the ￿xed component may various forms. It may be an up-front
15cash payment, paid when the contract is signed. This payment might be negative
- it would then be a participation fee, paid by the landowner when the contract is
signed. It might be an agreed target outcome level, which must be reached before
any payments under the variable component are made. It might be a package of
easily veri￿able actions and payments that can be carried out when the contract
is signed, or in some initial phase. In practice, biodiversity procurement contracts
usually specify some payments against the veri￿able provision of various inputs
(for example, erecting fences). In our framework such payments for immediate
veri￿able inputs would be part of the ￿xed component of the contract. There is
clearly considerable freedom in putting together the ￿xed component bundle a; we
would expect the equilibrium bid t to adjust so as to keep a + t constant.
The variable component of the contract, in the case of an o⁄-set market, is likely
to be quite steep. If agents are risk neutral, then at the margin they should be paid
the full social value of the increment in environmental services that they provide
(that is to say, b = 1 and they would be paid the full value of any output that
they produce beyond any contractually agreed target threshold). If agents are risk
averse, then they must be compensated to some degree for bearing risk: stochastic
production risk and measurement risk, and we would expect this cost to be built
into their initial bid. If agents are risk averse it is optimal to moderate the variable
component of the contract to introduce some risk sharing. Landholders might
receive, for example, 60 per cent of the value of output beyond the agreed threshold.
The slope of the contract will depend on the amount of risk (both production risk
and measurement risk) and on the degree of risk aversion; the higher these are,
the higher is the cost of risk bearing, and the ￿ atter (softer) will be the optimal
contract. Naturally, any actions that can be taken to reduce exposure to risk will
lead to more favourable (and steeper) contracts from the principal￿ s point of view.
For example, where it is e¢ cient, some level of insurance could be built in (for
example, output targets might be conditional on drought conditions, bush￿res, or
other events beyond the landowner￿ s control). The reduction of measurement and
monitoring risk through appropriate science and technology is also likely to be
very important.
Optimal contracts for procurement markets will di⁄er from those in an o⁄-set
market. In this case it is optimal to screen bidders, inducing them to reveal infor-
mation about their private characteristics by the type of contract that they choose,
and reducing the information rents that are paid to them. The incentive to screen
is stronger for private procurement than for public procurement, and the private
procurer will o⁄er a relatively wider range of contracts, including some that are
quite aggressive and will appeal only to high types, and some of lower power. Such
screening reduces information rents and the payment to agents, but potentially in-
duces lower e⁄ort levels. The public procurer will screen less aggressively, o⁄ering
16a menu of contracts intermediate in structure between the private procurer and
the o⁄-set market contract.
Contract design is thus sensitive to the institutional framework. In contrast, at
least within the theoretical framework17 used here, it is not sensitive to the number
of bidders. This means that contract design does not need to di⁄er according to
the intensity of competition; competition is harnessed by auctioning the right to
participate. If there are many potential suppliers, then they will bid down the
information rents in the auction. If the asset has no good substitutes, and there
are few potential suppliers then rents will be higher, and the designer will be
relying more on the screening properties of the contract to minimise rents.
The model that we have used here, based on the La⁄ont & Tirole (1986) pro-
curement model, is tractable, convenient and ￿ exible, and leads to useful insights
into the nature of the contract design problem for biodiversity procurement. It
would be good to know how robust these conclusions are to relaxing the assump-
tions embedded in this speci￿cation. It is unlikely that closed form solutions can
be found, and numerical simulation would be required. Before doing so, empirical
evidence on the validity of these assumptions would be valuable. More generally,
it would be valuable to understand the empirical inputs required for contract de-
sign. The key empirical inputs are the degree of risk aversion, the distribution of
types in the population, and the shape of the e⁄ort curve (and more generally the
nature of the biodiversity production function and the monitoring technology). As
is usual in the application of theory to policy, the main contribution of the frame-
work is probably its value in organising concepts and ideas. However some basis
for empirical judgements exists, and any contract design put forward in practice
implicitly takes a position on these empirical questions.
With respect to the distribution of types, there is a growing body of data from
environmental procurement auctions which may be amenable to econometric in-
vestigation (see for example Paarsch & Hong (2006)). Analysis of these datasets
could provide very valuable information. Getting information on the e⁄ort func-
tion and the production function for environmental goods may require a di⁄erent
approach. Biological and biophysical modelling and simulation is widely used to
model agricultural systems, and may be able to be adapted to model the pro-
duction of habitat and biodiversity assets. Direct experimentation may also be
possible. It may be valuable to design future procurement programs to facilitate
the estimation of such relationships, and the testing of the hypotheses underlying
the standard contracting framework.
17Most importantly, the separability of e⁄ort in the utility function and the quadratric e⁄ort
function.
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Figure 1: E⁄ort, outcomes, and transfers to type ￿:
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Figure 2: Optimal Contracts
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